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Jessica E. Bauml* 
“It is very difficult to do business if you have to wake up every day 
and say ‘OK, whose laws do I follow?’ . . . We have many countries and 
many laws and just one Internet.” – Heather Killen, former Yahoo! senior 
vice president of international operations, 2000.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 11, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 
summoned Internet content provider (ICP) Yahoo! into French courts for 
allowing the sale of Nazi memorabilia on its website, Yahoo.com.2 Marc 
Knobel, a French Jew, had previously discovered the offensive material 
and requested that Yahoo! remove it. Yahoo!, however, refused on the 
grounds that doing so would violate its constitutionally protected free 
speech. As a result, the company was summoned into French court. The 
French court ultimately held that allowing the sale of Nazi merchandise on 
Yahoo.com violated French criminal laws prohibiting the sale of Nazi 
goods,3 and, because Yahoo.com was either directly accessible to French 
citizens (or indirectly through Yahoo.fr, the French portal), the court 
ordered Yahoo! to block all access through either portal.4  
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme was a 
landmark case. It unearthed the complications that arise when multiple 
countries seek to regulate a borderless network like the Internet, which has 
the capacity to transmit instantly information all over the world—
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id.; see also Evan Scheffel, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitism: Court Refuses to Enforce French Order Attempting to Regulate Speech 
Occurring Simultaneously in the U.S. and in France, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 549, 549 (2003). 
 3. Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code makes it a crime to wear a uniform, 
insignia, or emblem reminiscent of those worn by either members of an organization 
declared criminal under Article 9 of Statute of the International Military Tribunal annexed 
to the London Accord of 8 August 1945 or by a person found guilty by a French or 
international court of one or more crimes against humanity. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 
R645-1 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419560&c
idTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719.  
 4. Scheffel, supra note 2, at 551–52. The French order required Yahoo! to  
(1) eliminate French citizens’ access to any material on the Yahoo.com auction 
site that offers for sale any Nazi objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags; (2) 
eliminate French citizens’ access to web pages on Yahoo.com displaying text, 
extracts, or quotations from Mein Kampf and Protocol of the Elders of Zion; (3) 
post a warning to French citizens on Yahoo.fr that any search through Yahoo.com 
may lead to sites containing material prohibited by Section R645-1 of the French 
Criminal Code, and that such viewing of the prohibited material may result in 
legal action against the Internet user; (4) remove from all browser directories 
accessible in the French Republic index headings entitled ‘negationists’ and from 
all hypertext links the equation of ‘negationists’ under the heading ‘Holocaust.’ 
The order subjects Yahoo! to a penalty of 100,000 Euros for each day that it fails 
to comply with the order.  
Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
1184–85 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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information that can be simultaneously legal in one country and illegal in 
another.5 The crux of the Yahoo! case was determining where to draw the 
line between two countries seeking to regulate information on the Internet. 
Instead of appealing in the French courts, Yahoo! returned to the 
United States to request relief in federal court. To abide fully by the French 
order, Yahoo! argued that it could not simply block access by French 
citizens to the illegal goods, but would have to block everyone’s access, 
including American citizens—“Asking us to filter access to our sites 
according to the nationality of web surfers is very naïve.”6 Unlike makers 
of tangible products (such as motor vehicles), Yahoo! argued that it 
provides an intangible product that could not easily be individually tailored 
for different markets, as “it had no power to identify where in the world its 
‘customers’ were from and thus no control over where in the world its 
digital products go.”7 Yahoo! contended that it should not be required to 
censor itself in order to comply with French laws. The company stated, 
“We hope that a U.S. judge will confirm that a non-U.S. court does not 
have the authority to tell a U.S. company how to operate.”8 The district 
court overturned the French court’s ruling on the grounds that, while a U.S. 
court typically defers to foreign orders, a federal court could not condone a 
violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.9  
                                                                                                                 
 5. Interestingly, the same year that the LICRA trial was taking place, Paul Krugman 
wrote a New York Times article in which he expressed concern over the effects the Internet 
might have on copyright and tax laws:  
[Internet] technology is erasing boundaries—the boundaries that we use to define 
intellectual property, the boundaries that we use to define tax jurisdictions. And in 
both cases the loss of effective boundaries, though it brings some direct 
advantages, threatens something important: the ability of creators to profit from 
their creations, the ability of governments to collect revenue. . . . Something 
serious, and troubling, is happening—and I haven’t heard any good ideas about 
what to do about it. 
Paul Krugman, Facing the Music: Napster Is Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 
2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/30/opinion/reckonings-facing-the-
music.html?src=pm (emphasis added). 
 6. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 6. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Id. at 8. 
 9. The District Court held that  
Although France has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in 
France, this Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of 
the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs 
simultaneously within our borders. . . . “The protection to free speech and the 
press embodied in [the First] amendment would be seriously jeopardized by the 
entry of foreign [ ] judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in 
[another country] but considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press 
by the U.S. Constitution.” 
Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93 (quoting Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992)); see also Scheffel, supra note 2, at 554. In 2001, 
Yahoo! surprisingly caved in, banning Nazi and Ku Klux Klan goods from all of its sites, 
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LICRA appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit, 
which, in 2006, reversed and remanded the case.10 The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision completely skirted the legal question, reversing purely on 
procedural grounds,11 an outcome that illustrates the murkiness that still 
exists in grappling with this complex legal quandary. Interestingly, the 
court’s opinion noted its uncertainty on the extent of Yahoo!’s “First 
Amendment right to violate French criminal law and to facilitate the 
violation of French criminal law by others.”12 In other words, the court was 
unsure of how far one country’s laws reach into other countries—unsure of 
where the line should be drawn between the sovereignty of each when it 
came to regulating content on the Internet.13 
The legal dilemma presented in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et L’Antisemitisme became even more complicated when the 
activities of American companies operating in Internet-restricting countries 
raised more serious questions of domestic and international law. While 
                                                                                                                 
saying it will no longer allow items that are “associated with groups that promote or glorify 
hatred or violence.” Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185; see also Jennifer Shyu, Speak No 
Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 224 (2008). Its 
actions, which the company claimed were unrelated to the lawsuit, appeared to be motivated 
by Yahoo!’s fears that it would lose substantial assets it had in the French market. See 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 8.  
 10.  Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1223–24 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 11. The Ninth Circuit held that the suit lacked ripeness. While the court acknowledged 
the important First Amendment issue at stake, it primarily took issue with the fact that 
Yahoo! had already complied with the French order: 
There was a live dispute when Yahoo! first filed suit in federal district court, but 
Yahoo! soon thereafter voluntarily changed its policy to comply, at least in part, 
with the commands of the French court’s interim orders. . . . Until we know 
whether further restrictions on access by French, and possibly American, users are 
required, we cannot decide whether or to what degree the First Amendment might 
be violated by enforcement of the French court’s orders, and whether such 
enforcement would be repugnant to California public policy.  
Id. at 1223–24.    
 12. Id. at 1221.  
 13. The court expressed the situation thus: 
What is at issue here is whether it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States for another nation to regulate speech by a United States resident 
within the United States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet 
users in that nation. In a world in which ideas and information transcend borders 
and the Internet in particular renders the physical distance between speaker and 
audience virtually meaningless, the implications of this question go far beyond the 
facts of this case. . . . There is little doubt that Internet users in the United States 
routinely engage in speech that violates, for example, China’s laws against 
religious expression, the laws of various nations against advocacy of gender 
equality or homosexuality, or even the United Kingdom’s restrictions on freedom 
of the press. If the government or another party in one of these sovereign nations 
were to seek enforcement of such laws against Yahoo! or another U.S.-based 
Internet service provider, what principles should guide the court’s analysis?  
Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  
Number 3] IT’S A MAD, MAD INTERNET 701 
Yahoo! refused to change its operations to accommodate French law, it has 
since changed its tune. In fact, over the last decade, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and 
Google have come under fire for their cooperation with the Chinese 
government and its strict censorship laws, sometimes even providing vital 
information leading to the arrest and torture of Chinese citizens.14 These 
ICPs have been criticized fiercely by human rights activists, the European 
Union, the United States government, and many others for being complicit 
in China’s human rights violations of free speech and expression. Yahoo!, 
Microsoft, and Google, however, argue that they have no choice but to 
comply with China’s censorship laws—otherwise, they risk being pushed 
out of the market altogether. Given a choice of two evils, these ICPs 
contend that it is better to remain in the market and provide some access 
than to leave altogether.15  
Should ICPs do the morally responsible thing and leave the market, or 
should they stay (or even be allowed to stay) in a market that mandates 
their complicity in such a rigid system of censorship?  
There is no doubt that corporate complicity in Chinese censorship 
raises significant concerns and, moreover, unearths complicated questions 
regarding how to tackle the issues that arise from these companies’ 
operations in the Chinese market. While there have been many proposals 
posited by multiple domestic and international sources in the hopes of 
addressing the human rights violations and stopping corporate complicity, 
this Note argues that none are sufficient to address properly the real 
problem. Furthermore, this Note argues that it would be a mistake to 
encourage or to force these ICPs to leave the market altogether. No one can 
deny the significant human rights abuses that occur in China as a result of 
its censorship laws; however, it is important not to implement quick fixes 
that fail to target the heart of this complex problem. This Note argues that it 
is far more beneficial to the ultimate goal of preserving Internet freedoms 
and stopping censorship in China if ICPs are allowed to maintain their 
market presence than if they are either forced to leave entirely or penalized 
for staying.  
Part II gives a brief overview of the unique challenges that the 
Internet presents to the international community, and it provides a general 
discussion of China’s censorship system, including what these ICPs are 
actually doing in China that is raising so many eyebrows, as well as the 
domestic and international laws that are being compromised in the process. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Brian R. Israel, “Make Money Without Doing Evil?” Caught Between Authoritarian 
Regulations in Emerging Markets and a Global Law of Human Rights, U.S. ICTs Face a 
Twofold Quandary, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 618–19 (2009). 
 15. Shyu, supra note 9, at 212; see also Google Censors Itself for China, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm. 
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Part III discusses the various solutions that have already been put on the 
table to address concerns over corporate complicity in Internet-censoring 
nations and argues that the present solutions are inadequate to address the 
real problem. Part IV posits that the best and most viable solution available, 
while seemingly not the most appealing, is to allow these companies to 
continue operating in China. The Note concludes that the tone moving 
forward should be one of patience and argues that the type of change many 
would like to see in China is very possible even without taking the drastic 
step of forcing ICPs like Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google out of the Chinese 
market. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
 The ubiquitous nature of the Internet itself sets the stage for the very 
distinct problems that emerge from American ICPs’ operations in China. 
And while China is not the only country to censor zealously the flow of 
information on the Internet,16 it has created what is considered the most 
complex and highly developed system of censorship in the world17—a 
system that has raised many concerns regarding the human rights violations 
that result from its implementation. This next section will briefly discuss 
why the Internet presents such a unique problem and then will discuss how 
China’s system of censorship is designed, the ICPs’ role in carrying out its 
policies, and finally, the domestically and internationally protected rights 
that are compromised as a result. 
A.  The Challenge of the Internet 
Due to its unique decentralized nature, the Internet poses distinct 
challenges for nations in their quest to regulate its content, and likewise, 
has created an interesting predicament for international relations. Scholars 
have posited that international trade has a spillover effect on international 
relations, transforming relationships among nations by promoting 
interdependence and consequently producing economic stability and peace 
in a globalizing world.18 While this is a valuable and fundamental theory on 
trade and international relations, it does not anticipate the complexities that 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Reporters Without Borders recently published an updated list of the worst offenders 
of Internet censorship, which included Saudi Arabia, Burma, North Korea, Cuba, Egypt, 
Iran, Uzbekistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. Web 2.0 Versus Control 2.0, 
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/web-2-0-versus-control-2-
0-18-03-2010,36697. 
 17. Jan Bruck, Reporters Without Borders Warns Against Internet Censorship, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5349061,00.html; 
List of the 13 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 7, 2006), 
http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13-internet-enemies-07-11-2006,19603. 
 18. See, e.g., RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE 24 (1986).  
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arise with the Information Age and the advent of the Internet.19  
By the 1990s, there was a general concern that the challenges the 
Internet presented to governing bodies would ultimately diminish the 
relevance of the nation-state all together: “The Internet . . . cannot be 
regulated.”20 These concerns have, if anything, intensified as more issues 
have been brought to the forefront of international debate. While the 
Internet has provided a medium for improving communication in an 
increasingly global and interconnected world, it is by its very nature 
borderless and can transmit information instantaneously. Likewise, unlike 
tangible products that are traded on the global market, content on the 
Internet cannot be tailored for individual markets but instead is globally 
accessible in an infinite number of locations and is stored in “cyberspace,” 
effectively “elud[ing] the control of any single business, individual, or 
country.”21 Because information is free-flowing and freely accessible, 
serious issues arise when multiple nations attempt to regulate such a 
ubiquitous medium, often resulting in conflict as the laws of different 
countries collide.22  
While scholars argue that trade between nations has a positive effect 
on international relations, we are now seeing a clash of interests when 
nations attempt to trade (and then regulate) a service such as the Internet. In 
this instance, American ICPs are now providing Internet services in foreign 
markets, but these foreign countries expect that the ICPs will comply with 
their laws—laws that potentially conflict with American laws as well as 
international laws. And, as the Ninth Circuit ruling in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La 
                                                                                                                 
 19. While international trade is certainly a good thing, the effects of international trade 
are not always positive, as many scholars have noted in their studies of globalization. See, 
e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS 
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (1st ed. 2002).  
 20. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Nicholas Negroponte, cofounder and 
director of MIT’s Media Lab).  
 21. Shyu, supra note 9, at 216. 
 22. James Rosenau discusses the increasing interconnectedness of the world 
(specifically with the advent of the Internet) and the complexities that arise from it:  
People are unsettled by the realization that deep changes are unfolding in every 
sphere of life, that events in any part of the world can have consequences for 
developments in every other part of the world, that the internet and other 
technologies have collapsed time and distance, that consequently national states 
and their governments are not as competent as they once were, that their 
sovereignty and boundaries have become increasingly porous, and that therefore 
the world has moved into a period of extraordinary complexity. 
James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 223, 223 (David Held & 
Anthony McGrew eds., 2003). Ironically, the Internet was initially intended to provide a 
network free from government restraints, “a new frontier, where people lived in peace, 
under their own rules, liberated from the constraints of an oppressive society and free from 
government meddling.” GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 13–14.  
704 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme illustrates, there is no clear 
answer in determining whose laws prevail when there is a conflict.  
This conflict raises the question, who does control the Internet? The 
uncertainty of this question adds further complexity to an already 
complicated matter when dealing with corporations operating in Internet-
censoring countries like China. Without a central body in place to regulate 
a borderless medium like the Internet, what results is a complex battle of 
legal systems with American ICPs seemingly stuck in the middle. 
B.  The Great Firewall of China 
The Internet has provided a contemporary vehicle for communication 
and free speech, but it brings with it great potential for abuse.23 While all 
countries censor Internet content to some degree, the Chinese government 
has a highly developed system of censorship that levies harsh penalties for 
violators.24 In fact, “China reportedly has the largest recorded number of 
imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world.”25  
China has the world’s most advanced and sophisticated system of 
censorship, comprised of technological and legislative controls used to 
regulate the flow of speech and information on the Internet.26 Often 
referred to as “the Great Firewall of China,” China’s censorship scheme 
particularly regulates the flow of information to and from the global 
Internet.27 Internet censorship is primarily regulated by the Ministry of 
Information Industry, and the State Counsel Information Office and the 
Propaganda Department are responsible for determining what content 
should be censored.28 There are nine licensed Internet access providers 
(IAP) that provide physical access to the Internet and numerous Internet 
service providers (ISP) that provide the service connection to the Internet.29 
Information flow is filtered at several levels: at the router level; through 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Justine M. Nolan, The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and Corporate 
Responsibility, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. art. 3, 1 (2009), 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=asjcl. 
 24. 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN 
CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 3 (2006), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf. 
 25. Background Information on Freedom of Expression in China, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/individuals-at-risk/priority-cases/background-information-on-
shi-tao/page.do?id=1361025 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); see also Israel, supra note 14, at 
618. 
 26. Miriam D. D’Jaen, Comment, Breaching the Great Firewall of China: Congress 
Overreaches in Attacking Chinese Internet Censorship, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 327, 327 
(2008). 
 27. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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ISPs; and, as is the focus of this Note, through ICPs. Companies such as 
Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft provide the means through which actual 
content (words, videos, pictures, sound) is transmitted over the Internet.30 
Though there are multiple levels to China’s system of censorship, the ICPs 
play a central role in making the entire operation tick.31 
Since 1996, China has enacted legislation to tighten control over the 
Internet—for example, by regulating news sites as well as imposing 
standards on businesses that offer Internet access.32 Its tight net of 
censorship has expanded over time and the government is currently 
censoring numerous sources such as newspapers, text messages, chat 
rooms, e-mails, blogs, and even video games and films.33 Furthermore, 
China’s regulations are needlessly vague, seeking to regulate content that 
“might harm the state’s honor, cause ethnic oppression, spread rumors, 
disrupt social stability, spread pornography, undermine state religious 
policy, or preach the beliefs of evil cults.”34 Instead of directly regulating 
ICPs, the Chinese government saves the legwork by requiring all ICPs to 
be licensed to operate, and then makes the ICPs responsible for preventing 
the transmission of politically objectionable or illegal information.35 To 
stay in line with Chinese laws, ICPs individually develop and maintain 
keywords and phrases that must either be blocked or monitored.36 This 
system often leads to overcensoring, because China’s overly broad 
guidelines make it unclear as to what is or is not acceptable content.37 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 12. 
 31. Kari Huus, Navigating China’s Web of Censors, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36041417/ns/technology_and_science-security/. 
 32. Interim Provisions Governing the Management of the Computer Information 
Networks in the People’s Republic of China Connecting to the International Network 
(promulgated by Decree No. 195 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
Feb. 1, 1996, effective Feb. 1, 1996) P.R.C. Laws, available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ipgtmotcinitproccttin1488/ (“strengthening the 
control on the computer information networks connecting to the international network”); Jill 
R. Newbold, Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S Corporations for Selling China 
Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 503, 510 (2003); 
Administration of Internet News Information Services Provisions (promulgated by the Press 
Office of the State Council and Ministry of Information Industry, Sep. 25, 2005, effective 
Sep. 25, 2005), P.R.C. Laws, available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2005-
09-25/18571.shtml (China) (“formulated in order to standardize internet news information 
services, satisfy the needs of the public for internet news information, safeguard national 
security and public interests, protect the lawful rights and interests of internet news 
information service units and promote the healthy and orderly development of internet news 
information services”). 
 33. Michael Wines et al., China’s Censors Tackle and Trip over the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 34. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 331 (quotations omitted). 
 35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 12. 
 36. Id. at 14–15. 
 37. Id. at 14. 
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Consequently, ICPs are not victims of the Chinese censorship system, but 
they are in fact direct participants in censoring Chinese citizens, a situation 
which has left these companies vulnerable to criticism, as well as liability,38 
for cooperating with Chinese censorship laws. 
C.   Domestic and International Laws on Freedom of Speech 
Freedom of speech is domestically and internationally recognized as a 
fundamental human right. The United States considers this right to be so 
paramount that free speech is enumerated in the very first amendment of 
the Constitution, providing for strong protections against government 
infringement of speech: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press….”39 This right is considered so central 
to American values that Congress proposed the Free Speech Protections 
Act of 2009 to provide added protection to American citizens’ right to free 
speech, calling the First Amendment “one of the most basic protections in 
our Constitution.”40 While First Amendment rights to free speech are 
certainly not limitless, the United States is deemed to have some of the 
world’s most liberal protections of speech.41 
Freedom of speech is also internationally recognized as a fundamental 
human right. This international recognition is enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Civil Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of the UDHR provides that  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.42  
The UDHR was adopted in 1948 and participating nations committed 
themselves to promote freedom of speech as a fundamental universal right. 
Ironically, China voted for the UDHR, but because it is not a treaty, the 
UDHR is not legally binding on any nation.43 The UDHR does, however, 
stand as an emblem of a universally recognized right to freedom of speech.  
The ICCPR, on the other hand, is a multilateral treaty adopted in 1966 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Israel, supra note 14, at 620.  
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 40. 155 CONG. REC. S2342–43 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2009/s449.html. 
 41. Exceptions to First Amendment guarantees include obscenity regulations, copyright 
protections, and regulations on commercial speech. See generally HENRY COHEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 95-815A, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2004).  
 42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19 (emphasis added). 
 43. Nolan, supra note 23, at 8. 
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that compels nations to protect, among other rights, freedom of speech.44 
The ICCPR recognizes free speech as a human right; however, it also 
prescribes limitations to be placed on the right. These limitations include 
“respect of the rights or reputations of others,” “the protection of national 
security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals,” or for 
prohibiting war propaganda and any national, racial, or religious hatred that 
can create hostility or a threat of violence.45  
However, while the ICCPR provides for limitations on free speech in 
specified circumstances, it requires that any regulations passed that limit 
free speech must be (1) prescribed by law; (2) implemented in order to 
protect the rights or reputations of others or to safeguard national security; 
and (3) necessary to achieve that purpose.46 Furthermore, even if a 
government presents a legitimate interest, the ICCPR requires that the 
scope of its application be limited strictly to that which is necessary to 
achieve its purpose, namely, “protecting national security, the right to 
freedom of expression and information can be restricted only in the most 
serious cases of a direct political or military threat to the entire nation.”47  
The UDHR and ICCPR provide formal recognition of freedom of 
speech as a fundamental right, but the actual scope of this right is 
delineated by each nation, causing variations from country to country. In 
the case of China, while it has been criticized for egregious human rights 
violations regarding freedom of speech, China contends that censorship is 
necessary to promote the nation’s stability and maintain security by 
avoiding political upheaval.48 However, China’s censorship laws are not 
prescribed by law. In fact, Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China actually provides for freedom of speech.49 Likewise, 
while China’s desire to safeguard national security appears to comport with 
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, its censorship laws are extreme and overly 
broad—resulting in the censoring of hundreds of political names and terms 
and even benign phrases like “cat abuse” and “mascot”50—and its penalties 
                                                                                                                 
 44. China has signed the treaty, but it has not yet ratified it and thus is not bound by its 
provisions. Id. at 9.   
 45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/14668, at art. 19–20 (Dec. 16, 1966), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-
English.pdf [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 46. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 3; Nolan, supra note 23, at 9–10. 
 47. Nolan, supra note 23, at 10 (quoting Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Resolution 1993/45, Reference E/CN.4/1995/32, ¶ 48 (Dec. 14, 1995) (by Abid Hussein)). 
 48. See D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 336. 
 49. XIANFA art. 35 (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 
 50. The Great Firewall of China: Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 18, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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for violators are disproportionate to the actual offense.51 While every 
country censors to a certain degree in the name of national security, 
China’s censorship laws are on the extreme end of the spectrum, imposing 
severe penalties for individuals who violate its laws.  
While China has been heavily criticized for the multiple human rights 
violations that result from its system of censorship, its policies are not 
executed solely by the Chinese government. Instead, China relies on 
outside entities such as ICPs to promote its censorship goals, adding further 
complications to the matter. 
D.  Corporate Complicity 
Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google have come under fire for being 
complicit, albeit in varying degrees, with Chinese censorship laws. Despite 
claims that their hands are tied in the matter and that they are helpless 
against China’s demands, by helping China carry out its censorship 
policies, these ICPs are running afoul of both domestically and 
internationally recognized protections of free speech. Yahoo! is perhaps the 
biggest offender; however, all three ICPs have been criticized for their 
roles in China.  
Yahoo! was the first to enter the Chinese market, developing the 
search engine Yahoo! China in 1999.52 Three years later, it signed a 
Chinese ethics pledge—the only ICP of the three to do so—agreeing to 
follow Chinese Internet regulations and to censor information that may 
jeopardize security or stability.53 Google also established a censored 
version of its Chinese domain, Google China (google.cn), in January of 
2006, after years of its google.com portal being “sporadically blocked” by 
the Chinese government.54 By entering China’s market, Google escaped the 
fate of being censored by Chinese filters, but was required to comply with 
China’s laws in filtering keywords or phrases from its searches.55 Microsoft 
                                                                                                                 
dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554.html. Roughly fifteen percent of blocked 
terms are related to sex, while the rest are political terms, including names of political 
leaders, intellectuals, dissidents, and terms such as “freedom” and “democracy.” A List of 
Censored Words in Chinese Cyberspace, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2004/08/the-words-you-never-see-in-chinese-cyberspace/ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2011).  
 51. Such penalties include arrest, long-term detainment, and (reportedly) torture. Nolan, 
supra note 23, at 7.  
 52. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 332. 
 53. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 12. 
 54. Kristopher Huynh, Google Enters the Chinese Market, Practising Enlightened Self-
Censorship, CSR GROUP (Feb. 26, 2006), 
http://www.thecsrgroup.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/17-Google-enters-the-Chinese-
market,-practising-enlightened-self-censorship.html; Google Censors Itself for China, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm. 
 55. See Google Censors Itself for China, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006), 
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entered China’s market with its MSN search engine, establishing MSN 
China in mid-2005.56 
As a result of their presence in the Chinese market, these ICPs have 
been linked to the controversial arrests of several Chinese dissidents. Some 
of these arrests have allegedly resulted in torture, prolonged detainment, 
and even death.57 In 2005, a Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, received ten years 
in prison for leaking “state secrets” after sending a Communist document to 
an overseas prodemocracy website through his personal Yahoo! account.58 
The Chinese government discovered Shi Tao’s identity by demanding his 
personal information from Yahoo!’s Hong Kong office (which readily 
handed over the information).59 In the same year, Microsoft’s MSN shut 
down the popular blog maintained by Chinese journalist Zhao Jing after 
Chinese authorities requested that it be deleted.60 Finally, in 2002, Wang 
Xiaoning was arrested for publishing prodemocracy material after Yahoo! 
handed over his information—an arrest which resulted in Wang’s wife 
suing Yahoo! for “corporate irresponsibility.”61 These examples, while far 
from daily occurrences, serve as an important reminder of the profound 
consequences of ICP complicity in China’s extreme system of censorship.  
Though in varying degrees, all three companies have caved to China’s 
demands, and consequently these companies face global criticism for the 
resulting human rights violations and may face liability for their actions. As 
a result of their operations in China, these corporations are being haled into 
American courts by Chinese citizens for violations of U.S. law,62 and the 
problem leaves many questioning what can be done to stop corporate 
complicity all together. 
III. PROPOSALS ADDRESSING CORPORATE COMPLICITY  
Numerous avenues have been explored in the effort to hold ICPs 
responsible for their complicity in human rights violations in China. First, 
                                                                                                                 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm. 
 56. David Cohn, MSN Enters Chinese Market, WIRED NEWS REP. (May 26, 2005), 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/05/67651. 
 57. Israel, supra note 14, at 620. 
 58. Case Highlight: Shi Tao and Yahoo, HRIC, 
http://www.hrichina.org/public/highlight/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 59. China: Shi Tao, PEN AM. CENTER, 
http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/764/prmID/172 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 60. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 333. Moreover, Jing’s website was located on servers in 
the United States, not China, creating more concern regarding MSN’s actions. Surya Deva, 
Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares for the Global Compact 
or the Global Online Freedom Act?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 255, 270 (2007). 
 61. Wang Xiaoning Multimedia Informaiton, JOE INVESTOR ONLINE, 
http://www.joeinvestoronline.com/library/Wang-Xiaoning.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).  
 62. Case Highlight, supra note 58. 
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foreigners have sued these ICPs in American courts under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting human rights violations in China. 
Second, the Global Online Freedom Act, the Global Network Initiative, and 
the Global Compact have been developed to discourage further complicity. 
However, at least at the present time, none of these options have proven 
effective in holding these companies liable for their operations in China. 
A.  International Law 
Traditionally, violations of international law have been imposed on 
state actors—but, since the Nuremberg Trials during World War II, liability 
has been imposed on individual actors as well.63 However, there has been 
an increasing push to apply international law to corporations like Yahoo!, 
Google, and Microsoft. Since corporations have grown and entered the 
global market, their operations began to have more serious ramifications on 
the global market and the world. As corporations become more powerful, 
many argue that because these entities look and act more like states than 
mere companies, they should be treated as such under international law. 
Consequently, these ICPs have been sued in American courts under the 
ATS (also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act)64 for the human rights 
violations that have occurred as a result of their operations in China. 
The ATS was enacted in 1789 but remained largely unused until 
198065 when Filartiga v. Pena-Irala66 held that the Act provided 
jurisdiction in federal courts over tort suits brought by aliens (and only by 
aliens) for violations of “the law of nations” (i.e., customary international 
law).67 However, the language of the ATS does not explicitly address who 
may be held liable for violations of international law—that is, while 
international law has since recognized that individuals, as well as states, 
may be held liable for violations under international law, it is not clear 
whether corporations should be considered “individuals” under the ATS.68 
Though corporate liability under the ATS is still unsettled, many courts 
                                                                                                                 
 63. “The singular achievement of international law since the Second World War has 
come in the area of human rights, where the subjects of customary international law—i.e., 
those with international rights, duties, and liabilities—now include not merely states, but 
also individuals.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”).  
 65.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115–16.  
 66. 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 67. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116. 
 68.  See id. at 118 n.10; Chimène I. Keitner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Another 
Round in the Fight over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, ASIL INSIGHTS, 
Sept. 2010, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.asil.org/insights100930.cfm.   
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have assumed that corporations can be held liable under the ATS.69 On 
September 17, 2010, however, the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum may have thrown a major wrench in finding corporate liability 
under the ATS. Kiobel dealt with claims by Nigerian residents against Shell 
Transport and Trading Company PLC for aiding and abetting the Nigerian 
government in human rights violations during oil exploration.70 The Second 
Circuit (relying on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain71) held that corporations could 
not be held liable under the ATS because they are not individuals as 
understood under customary international law—that while domestic law 
might recognize corporations as individuals in terms of conferring liability, 
international law has not done so.72  
By conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a limited number of 
offenses defined by customary international law, the ATS requires 
federal courts to look beyond rules of domestic law—however well-
established they may be—to examine the specific and universally 
accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as binding in their 
dealings with one another.73  
In its reasoning, the majority noted, for example, that a proposal at the 
Rome Conference to grant jurisdiction over corporations in the 
International Criminal Court was “soundly rejected.”74 Likewise, it found 
that “no corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability under the 
customary international law of human rights . . . .”75 While Kiobel has not 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
plaintiff properly stated a claim under the ATS for violations of international law against a 
corporate defendant); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“In addition to private individual liability, we have also recognized corporate defendants 
are subject to liability under the ATS and may be liable for violations of the law of 
nations.”) (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)); Doe I 
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that state action was not 
required to find liability under the ATS); Kadic v. Karadži, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its 
reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.”). But see Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
(“Courts have also divided over whether and under what circumstances a private person or 
corporation can violate customary international law.”); Mark Hamblett, 2nd Circuit Rejects 
Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Act Cases, LAW.COM (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202472226419. 
 70. The claims included “aiding and abetting (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against 
humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and 
detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced 
exile; and (7) property destruction.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123. 
 71. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 72. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. at 121. 
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yet been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,76 many believe that its 
holding will not only have a significant impact on ATS cases brought in the 
Second Circuit, but also that it will have “broad-reaching application” in 
many other courts.77 
What does this case mean for ICPs in China? Previously, some 
Chinese victims of human rights violations have brought suit against 
Yahoo!, Google, and MSN under the ATS and have met with some 
success.78 After Kiobel, however, it appears that (at least for now) this door 
may very well be closing. Therefore, while there is a great deal of support 
for imposing international law and human rights obligations on 
corporations, Kiobel may have foreclosed a very viable mechanism through 
which to find corporations liable under the ATS. For now, it appears that it 
is up to the governments where corporations are domiciled to deal with the 
sticky legal situations that their corporations face. 
B.  The Global Online Freedom Act 
In response to mounting criticism regarding Yahoo!, Google, and 
Microsoft’s cooperation with China’s censorship laws, the U.S. House of 
Representatives held a joint committee hearing in 2006 with executives 
from Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft to discuss their business practices in 
China. As a result of this hearing, Congress proposed the Global Online 
Freedom Act of 2006 (GOFA) on February 16, 2006.79 The Act (later re-
introduced in 200780) was intended to create “corporate responsibility of [ ] 
companies to protect and uphold human rights”81 and to provide for civil 
and criminal penalties for noncompliance.82 In other words, GOFA aimed 
to bring the ICPs’ business practices in line with internationally recognized 
rights to freedom of speech.83 This Act was an ambitious attempt by the 
U.S. government to confront issues with corporate business practices in 
other countries; however, GOFA is not an appropriate means of 
confronting the problem, for reasons that will be discussed below, and thus 
likely will not become law. The primary goal of the Act, if implemented, 
                                                                                                                 
 76. The Second Circuit denied the plaintiff’s motion for rehearing en banc on February 
4, 2011. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2011 WL 338048 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 77. See, e.g., Hamblett, supra note 69 (internal quotation omitted).  
 78. For example, Yahoo! settled an ATS case brought against it that led to the arrest of 
Shi Tao. Families of Shi Tao and Wang Xiaoning (Yahoo! Inc), WORLD ORG. FOR HUM. RTS. 
USA, http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 
15&Itemid=35 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).  
 79.  Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 80.  See D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 329.  
 81.  Global Online Freedom Act of 2006 § 2(15). 
 82. Id. § 207.  
 83. Id. § 2(1). 
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presents extraterritorial concerns that the United States must take into 
consideration. The intent of GOFA was “[t]o promote freedom of 
expression on the Internet [and] to protect United States businesses from 
coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign governments . 
. . .”84 In essence, by passing the Act, the United States would be 
attempting to regulate business practices that occur outside its borders. 
While traditionally states have jurisdiction to ensure that nonstate actors are 
complying with international law within their borders, “extraterritoriality” 
refers to actions by a state that regulate its citizens beyond its borders.85  
The United States has long followed a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.86 As the recent district court decision in Yahoo!, Inc. v. 
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme illustrates, the United 
States is very hesitant to extend its laws beyond its borders particularly 
when it comes to regulating the Internet. The court there stated: 
In a world in which ideas and information transcend borders and the 
Internet in particular renders the physical distance between speaker and 
audience virtually meaningless, the implications of this question go far 
beyond the facts of this case. The modern world is home to widely 
varied cultures with radically divergent value systems. There is little 
doubt that Internet users in the United States routinely engage in 
speech that violates, for example, China’s laws against religious 
expression, the laws of various nations against advocacy of gender 
equality or homosexuality, or even the United Kingdom's restrictions 
on freedom of the press. If the government or another party in one of 
these sovereign nations were to seek enforcement of such laws against 
Yahoo! or another U.S.-based Internet service provider, what 
principles should guide the court’s analysis?87  
Likewise, there is still a question of the extent to which international law 
permits a country to apply its laws to corporations when they operate 
outside of the country’s own borders. While the Human Rights Committee 
has not explicitly prohibited extraterritorial regulations,88 it also has not 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. pmbl. 
 85. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 338; see also Nolan, supra note 23, at 12. 
 86. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 338. David Held’s discussion of the classic regime of 
sovereignty reflects this presumption against extraterritoriality. He stated,  
The classic regime of sovereignty highlights the development of a world order in 
which states are nominally free and equal; enjoy supreme authority over all 
subjects and objects within a given territory; form separate and discreet political 
orders with their own interests . . . ; engage in diplomatic initiatives but otherwise 
in limited measures of cooperation; regard cross-border processes as a ‘private 
matter’ concerning only those immediately affected . . . .  
David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?, in 
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION 
DEBATE 162, 162–63 (2003). 
 87. Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 88. For example, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article 2(1) of the 
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considered this question in the context of extraterritorial corporate 
actions.89 Therefore, if the United States should decide that extraterritorial 
regulation is necessary in this situation, it is not entirely clear that GOFA’s 
extraterritorial encroachments are justified under international law. 
Furthermore, even if the United States decided to impose 
extraterritorial regulations on its corporations (and its actions were not 
prohibited under international law), GOFA runs the risk of imposing 
American views of free speech on the rest of the world. The Act gives the 
President full power to designate countries as being “Internet-restricting” 
based on a number of factors including the extent that the country filters 
content and the number of dissidents prosecuted.90 The President is then 
expected to provide a yearly report of countries that have made the list.91 
GOFA would also provide for an Office of Global Internet Freedom, which 
would “serve as the focal point for interagency efforts to protect and 
promote freedom of electronic information abroad . . . .”92 The aims of the 
Office would be to (1) create a global strategy to combat state-sponsored 
censorship; (2) identify and publicize keywords, terms, and phrases 
censored by each Internet-restricting country; (3) work with companies 
operating abroad to develop a voluntary code of minimum corporate 
standards; and (4) advise congressional committees on whether further 
legislative action is needed to keep the Act relevant.93 While GOFA seeks 
to bring its companies in line with the human rights recognized in the 
UDHR, it does so in a manner that risks imposing Americanized notions of 
free speech on other countries because the Act gives complete discretion to 
the President and a government agency without any input from other 
international bodies.  
Every country provides varying degrees of protection for speech on 
the Internet. While China is on the extreme end of the spectrum (having 
made Reporters Without Borders’s 2006 “List of the 13 Internet 
Enemies”),94 the United States is toward the other end, with some of the 
                                                                                                                 
ICCPR (regarding a nation-state’s duty to ensure individual rights) as conferring jurisdiction 
on the nation-state to “anyone within the power or effective control of that State party even 
if not situated within the territory of the State party.” U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, 
General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 12, 2004), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ca12c3a4ea8d6c53c1256d500056e56f/$FILE/G044130
2.pdf; Nolan, supra note 23, at 13 (citation omitted). 
 89. Nolan, supra note 23, at 13. 
 90. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. §§ 105(a)(1), 103(a) 
(2006). 
 91. Id. § 105(b)(1). 
 92. Id. § 104(b)(1). 
 93. Id. § 104(2)–(7). 
 94. List of the 13 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 7, 2006), 
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more liberal approaches to Internet censorship.95 But even the Internet in 
the United States is far from unregulated, and, according to OpenNet 
Initiative, “the United States may be among the most aggressive states in 
the world in terms of listening to online conversations.”96 Furthermore, 
China is not the only country whose laws clash with the United States’ 
regarding censoring information on the Internet. As illustrated in the 
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, the First 
Amendment protections in the U.S. Constitution conflicted with French 
laws prohibiting the sale of Nazi merchandise.97 Likewise, Australia has 
decided to join China in implementing a government-mandated system of 
censorship where its plans to filter content relating to pornography, 
bestiality, rape, and child pornography have been highly criticized for 
being too expansive, potentially resulting in the unwarranted blockage of 
content with “strong social, political and/or educational value.”98  
What constitutes “protected speech” is very much reflective of a 
nation’s culture, politics, and history; even China’s extreme censorship 
policies are a response to the country’s deep concern with maintaining 
stability in such a densely populated nation.99 Since cultural, political, and 
historical attributes play into every nation’s concept of protected speech, it 
should not be up to one country to decide what should or should not 
constitute protected speech. GOFA requires the President of the United 
States to determine which countries are “Internet-restricting,” but it does 
not set out any substantive means of making this determination. It only 
dictates that “[a] foreign country shall be designated as an Internet-
restricting country if the President determines that the government of the 
country is directly or indirectly responsible for a systemic pattern of 
substantial restrictions on Internet freedom . . . .”100 “Substantial 
restrictions” is not clearly defined, leaving the President to make that 
judgment. Without any concrete notions of free speech to draw upon, 
                                                                                                                 
http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13-internet-enemies-07-11-2006,19603. 
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 96. Id. 
 97.  Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 98.  Jessica Guynn, Google, Yahoo Object to Proposed Internet Censorship in Australia, 
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granting such broad discretion risks unduly imposing American notions of 
“protected speech” without deeper considerations of the cultural reasoning 
behind other notions of free speech.   
GOFA creates the potential for bad blood between China and the 
United States at a time when their relationship is already tenuous. One of 
the considerations for implementing extraterritorial regulations is comity, 
or legal reciprocity:  
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, 
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. 
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.101 
When creating legislation that has extraterritorial effects, it is important to 
be mindful of the conflicts that can ensue when one nation attempts to 
extend its laws and regulations beyond its own borders.  
The current relationship between China and the United States has 
been described as “inextricably intertwined, locked in a kind of co-
dependency . . . .”102 China holds about $800 billion of America’s debt,103 
while the United States is China’s most important market for its goods.104 
Both economies are so completely entangled and dependent on the other 
that they essentially control each other’s fate—China “can pull the rug out 
from under [America’s] economy only if they want to pull the rug out from 
under themselves.”105 While China does not want to jeopardize its 
relationship with the United States, the United States also has an interest in 
maintaining a good relationship with China.  
Passing GOFA, however, could strain that relationship. President 
Obama’s visit to China in November 2009 and his interactions with 
Chinese officials reflected an unwillingness to put such an important 
relationship on the line in order to address China’s censorship laws. When 
asked by a Chinese student whether the United States would “respect” the 
differences between American and Chinese censorship laws, Obama 
responded that “it’s very important for the U.S. not to assume what is good 
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for us is good for you.”106 Likewise, newspaper headlines noted Obama’s 
“gentle critique” of China’s human rights violations.107 Obama’s visit to 
China reflected a general understanding that the United States’ relationship 
with China is too vital to jeopardize by passing legislation that has the great 
potential to upset an already strained situation.  
GOFA is commendable in its attempts to address the serious issue of 
American corporations’ complicity in Chinese censorship; however, it is 
not likely to become law for important reasons. GOFA raises 
extraterritorial concerns that must be carefully considered. As it is currently 
written, GOFA lacks an inherent understanding of the cultural, political, 
and historical motives behind every nation’s concept of protected speech. 
While the relationship between Internet censorship and human rights is an 
important topic for the United States GOFA is an inappropriate means to 
address those issues, and its passage could threaten to disrupt an already 
tenuous relationship between two of the world’s super powers.  
C. Global Network Initiative  
Since the Global Online Freedom Act was last introduced in 2007, it 
has not yet been passed into law, and, for reasons already stated, the United 
States government does not appear to be in the position to address Internet 
censorship problems at this time. Yet ICPs have still found themselves 
between a rock and a hard place in trying to maintain market presence 
internationally while avoiding human rights violations as a result of their 
business relationships. In October 2008, spurred at least in part by their 
predicament in China, American ICPs teamed up with nongovernment 
organizations, investors, and scholars. This two-year collaboration resulted 
in the development of an industry-wide code of conduct called the Global 
Network Initiative (GNI).108 The GNI addresses the “increasing 
government pressure [companies face] to comply with domestic laws and 
policies in ways that may conflict with the internationally recognized 
human rights of freedom of expression and privacy” and is intended to 
advance a global response toward protecting and advocating freedom of 
expression and privacy.109  
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The GNI is guided by three documents that make up its core 
commitments: the Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy; the 
Implementation Guidelines; and the Governance, Accountability and 
Learning Framework.110 The Principles detail the broader goals of the GNI 
in establishing a framework for companies to advance and defend 
internationally recognized human rights through their business practices.111 
The Implementation Guidelines expound on the Principles by providing 
more guidance on how companies are to translate these Principles into 
actual practice. The Governance, Accountability and Learning Framework 
sets up a multistakeholder organization (governed by a board of directors), 
which is intended to drive the program forward.112 This organization is 
empowered to, among other things, recruit new participants, create 
collaborative forums, establish a means for third parties to express their 
concerns or questions, and to communicate with participant companies in 
developing an independent accountability system for assessing company 
compliance.113 These documents provide the structure and framework for 
the entire GNI. 
The Governance, Accountability and Learning Framework provides 
for a three-phase timeline for the GNI to become fully operational. The 
GNI just finished phase one, which lasted from 2009 to 2010.114 During 
that time, companies focused on recruiting new participants and 
implementing the Principles in their business practices.115 At the same time, 
the organization was required to find and train independent assessors (to be 
used later on in evaluating participating companies), and also provided 
information and expertise to the participating companies as they 
implemented their changes.116 Phase two began in 2011, during which time 
independent assessors will evaluate and create a written report on each 
company’s implementation of the Principles (also called a process 
review).117 The third phase begins in 2012 and continues on from there. At 
that point, assessors will be required to carry out a case review of 
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participating companies by delving deeper into the companies’ everyday 
practices, assessing the effectiveness of each company’s policies and their 
responses to government demands in Internet-restricting countries.118 
Throughout the process, the organization and participants are expected to 
continue to bring in new recruits,119 and, by phase three, the GNI should be 
in full swing. 
On its face, the GNI appears to tackle some of the critical issues 
inherent in GOFA. The GNI attempts to address on a global scale issues 
that GOFA sought to address through only the narrow lens of American 
law. Likewise, the GNI creates a forum for disseminating information on 
international laws and provides assistance to companies in order to help 
them minimize their contributions to human rights violations. Most 
importantly, it places all participating ICPs on a level playing field by 
creating uniform guidelines for every company and enabling these 
companies to work together to oppose government demands that potentially 
compromise human rights.120 Therefore, on its face, the GNI appears to be 
an effective alternative to some of the major shortcomings of GOFA.  
However, some inherent problems exist in the GNI’s makeup that 
could hamper its ability to meet its critical goals. Most importantly, while 
the GNI seeks to be global, it is currently comprised of largely American 
companies, organizations, and scholars.121 Further, it has only twenty-five 
participants,122 and it has failed to gain commitments from Internet giants 
like Twitter, Facebook, Amazon.com, and Skype.123 In fact, the only ICPs 
that have actually signed on are Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft. The GNI 
seeks to create a stronger pushback against Internet-restricting 
governments, yet these three American ICPs do not hold enough market 
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power in China to be a sufficient force against government demands.124 
While it may be too soon to declare the GNI a failure, if it cannot recruit 
other ICPs, it is unlikely that it will be able to exercise sufficient leverage 
to accomplish its goals. The GNI also needs more international presence 
than it currently has, in order to avoid looking merely like GOFA in 
disguise rather than a global code of conduct for companies. 
One of the biggest criticisms of the GNI (and a large reason why 
several international organizations such as Reporters Without Borders and 
Amnesty International currently do not back it) is that the GNI lacks 
sufficient “teeth” to get the job done.125 The language in the GNI leaves too 
much discretion to participating companies in responding to government 
demands—calling for companies to “assess the human rights risks . . . 
where they operate and develop appropriate mitigation strategies to 
address these risks” as well as to “[n]arrowly interpret and implement 
government demands . . . .”126 While companies are responsible for seeking 
advice when necessary, the language of the GNI provides loose guidelines 
for companies, leaving too much to the judgment and discretion of 
participating companies in responding to government directives.127 The 
organization will publicize companies that are found in noncompliance 
with the Principles; however, there are no real penalties set out for 
companies that shirk their obligations.128 The GNI also does not outright 
forbid companies from complying with government demands that violate 
international laws, leaving many to argue that the GNI does not actually 
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eliminate the risk of human rights abuses.129 In short, the success of the 
GNI lies largely in the hands of the member companies to carry out their 
responsibilities. Thus, while the GNI is a “step in the right direction,”130 
several international groups are waiting to endorse the plan, remaining 
cautiously optimistic about its success.131 
While many have not completely written off the success of the GNI, 
there are plenty of hurdles that the program must overcome before it can 
prove its value. It is essential that the GNI recruit more members, and it 
must find well-known, international telecommunications companies that 
are willing to commit to its Principles.132 Further, to assuage the concerns 
of many international groups that the enforcement provisions of the GNI 
are too weak to discourage its membership from contributing to human 
rights abuses, the language of the GNI should either be reformed to address 
the weaknesses in its framework. Otherwise, the GNI’s success will 
continue to depend on its participants’ mere promises to uphold the 
Principles. 
D.  The Global Compact 
The Global Compact is a multistakeholder initiative133 intended to 
“ensure that markets, commerce, technology and finance advance in ways 
that benefit economies and societies everywhere.”134 Similar to the GNI, it 
is a global initiative created in order to bring business practices in line with 
internationally accepted “core values” of good business in the areas of 
human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anticorruption.135 
However, while the Compact has some definite strengths not present in the 
GNI, it shares some of its very fundamental weaknesses, making it a useful 
mechanism to improve company operations abroad but ultimately missing 
the mark in offering a sound solution to solving the problems of corporate 
complicity in China. 
While the GNI is struggling to become a truly global initiative, the 
Compact does not suffer from that same problem. It is a United Nations 
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initiative and is in fact “the largest voluntary corporate responsibility 
initiative in the world.”136 Since its launch in July 2000, the Compact has 
attracted a significant number of participants and now consists of about 
8,000 members, which include a diverse number of governments, 
companies, and organizations from all over the world.137 It is guided by 
“The Ten Principles,” which are based on core principles of international 
law found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. As such, the Principles are 
truly a global response to reforming corporate business practices in a 
globalizing market.138 
While the Compact is made up of an impressive number of 
participants, it has fielded some heavy criticisms regarding its 
effectiveness.139 The Compact seeks to implement its objectives through 
leadership, dialogues, learning, and networking,140 but it is does not act as a 
regulatory body to ensure that its practices are being properly implemented 
and followed.141 In fact, there is no mechanism in place properly to police 
participant efforts nor does it penalize those that are not fulfilling their 
commitment.142 Furthermore, the Principles are very vague and provide 
little guidance to companies that wish to follow the Compact’s policies. For 
example, Principles 1 and 2 provide that “[b]usinesses should support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights” and 
“make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”143 Such 
broad codes of conduct not only create potential problems for companies 
looking to improve their business practices, but also make it easier for 
disingenuous corporations to circumvent the code of conduct altogether.144  
                                                                                                                 
 136. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra 
note 134; UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited Apr. 
14, 2011). 
 137. UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 
136; Participant Search, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 138. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 135.  
 139. There is, in fact, an entire blog devoted to keeping a watchful and critical eye on the 
Compact. See GLOBAL COMPACT CRITICS, http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 140. For an example of how the Compact is set up to promote its objectives, see 
Analyzing Progress, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/analyzing_progress.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 141. Deva, supra note 60, at 293. 
 142. Id. 
 143.  The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 135. 
 144. Deva, supra note 60, at 296. 
Number 3] IT’S A MAD, MAD INTERNET 723 
Despite its large participant base, many have questioned whether the 
Compact is effective at changing business practices or whether it is simply 
being utilized by corporations to “polish” or “bluewash” their images.145 
For example, the Compact requires participants to submit annual 
statements detailing how they are complying with the Ten Principles.146 If 
companies do not submit these reports, they can be “delisted” or kicked out 
of the Compact, and surprisingly, over 1,800 companies have already been 
ejected for not submitting reports.147 Then, in March of 2010, the Compact 
placed a one year moratorium on delisting companies due to concerns that 
too many companies were being ejected.148 The moratorium was retroactive 
(running from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010)149 and was intended 
to allow the Board to “explore solutions to a systemic lack of disclosure in 
certain markets.”150 However, after the moratorium was lifted on December 
31, 2010, 200 more companies were de-listed, bring the total number of 
expelled companies to 2,000.151 
Today, the Global Compact is continuing its attempts to increase 
transparency and to improve effective implementation of its policies by, for 
example, developing (and publicizing) a grading system in which 
participating companies are ranked based on their “levels of progress 
disclosure.”152 Yet only time will tell whether these changes will ultimately 
be effective, and many argue that the success of the Compact will remain in 
question until it can definitively show that its policies are having a real 
impact on corporate behavior.153 
E.  Changing Gears in Combating Corporate Complicity 
 Ultimately, the Compact, like GOFA, the GNI, and the ATS, fails to 
address fully the problems that arise from corporate complicity in China. 
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However, while many raise serious concerns regarding these ICPs’ 
operations, and rightly so, punishing ICPs or removing them altogether is 
not the appropriate step forward. In fact, American ICPs need not be 
viewed as the enemies. As will be discussed below, their presence in China 
provides very tangible benefits. In the end, there are more serious concerns 
pertaining to the system of censorship in China, and the ultimate focus 
should not be on the ICPs, but on China itself.  
IV. MOVING FORWARD: SCALING THE GREAT FIREWALL OF 
CHINA 
While there have been many alternatives proposed to address 
corporate complicity with Chinese censorship laws, they focus too much on 
making quick fixes and have the potential to push the issue in the wrong 
direction—making matters worse, not better. What is ultimately at issue is 
not simply ICPs’ complicity in China, but the broader issues pertaining to 
China’s system of censorship. If we truly want to address corporate 
complicity, we must do so in a manner that addresses the human rights 
violations themselves. And if we want to improve Internet freedoms in 
China, we must be realistic about what success can look like there—in 
other words, we need to reconceptualize what it would take to bring change 
to China. 
It is important to keep in mind that, although China has steadily 
become a super power with a population of approximately 1.33 billion and 
a GDP of $4.9 trillion in 2009,154 it is still very much a developing 
country.155 In fact, in 2009, its per capita GDP was only $3,650 per year,156 
which is significantly lower than the per capita GDP of developed 
countries157 (for example, the United States’ 2009 per capita sat at about 
$46,360158). China has also experienced exponential economic growth at a 
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much faster pace than developed countries.159 Consequently, China has 
become an economic giant but lags behind developed countries in many 
respects.160 Its economic growth is expected to create “an unprecedented 
shift that will create big challenges for every aspect of the urban systems, 
including health, education, housing, energy, food, and water.”161 China, 
therefore, is still very much a growing nation that is finding its legs. It has 
seen considerable change, and it is sure to see more moving into the future; 
however, it seems unrealistic to hold China to American or Western 
standards of free speech and democracy and to expect huge changes in 
short order. Similarly, it is merely conjecture to say that China’s notion of 
free speech will not look more Western in the future. 
The United States itself has seen its own free speech protections 
evolve significantly over the last two centuries. The First Amendment was 
adopted in 1791 and its protections have significantly evolved—waxing 
(and waning) since the 1700s. For example, just eleven years after the 
Constitution’s adoption, the Sedition Acts of 1798 were enacted to protect 
the government against seditious attacks of those who opposed it.162 While 
short-lived, these Acts were heavily criticized at the time for being a 
significant abridgment on speech.163 In the 1800s, state governments were 
denying speech protections to minorities,164 since First Amendment 
protections were not even applied to the states until 1925 when the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed free 
speech protections against state intrusion.165 Concerns over protecting 
speech from government encroachment are still very much present today. 
More recently, the Bush Administration fielded strong criticism for 
enacting the USA PATRIOT Act. In particular, section 215 of the Act 
(which gives the government broad powers to obtain personal records of 
any citizen) has been attacked for the chilling effect it could have on free 
speech.166  
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And the First Amendment continues to evolve every day.167 In fact, as 
more acts of “cyber-terrorism” occur—like the publication of classified 
documents by WikiLeaks—the government has shown more and more 
distrust and fear of the Internet, making some wonder whether the U.S. 
government may place increased restrictions on Internet speech in the 
future.168 Senator Jay Rockefeller, for example, recently remarked that the 
Internet is the “‘number one hazard’ to national security” and felt that “it 
would have been better if ‘we had never invented the Internet.’”169  
On the same token, China, in all actuality, is a maturing nation and 
has not had as much time as nations such as the United States to develop its 
laws and policies. As China grows as a country, the potential for change 
will grow along with it, especially in its stance on speech protections. For 
now, we must temper our expectations for China and understand that 
allowing ICPs to maintain a presence in China will be more beneficial than 
forcing them out. 
Since change will likely only come with time, it is of the utmost 
importance that American ICPs remain in China. Chinese search engines 
are already dominant in its market (Baidu’s market share is projected to be 
at seventy-nine percent for 2011),170 indicating that China could easily 
maintain its system of censorship without any outside assistance from 
American ICPs.171 Furthermore, even critics of Chinese censorship laws 
admit that search engines like Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft provide 
search results that are “markedly less censored than rivals like Baidu.”172 
Likewise, since Google produces an error message on its search engine 
alerting users when their search results have been censored, Google has at 
least informed the public that they were being censored.173 Considering that 
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these ICPs are not essential elements to facilitating China’s firewall, 
removing them from the market altogether would not hinder China’s 
censorship policies. In fact, forcing these companies out will only further 
insulate the Chinese market. Maintaining a presence in China is crucial to 
making any progress—and, at the very least, it is a glimmer of hope that 
change is possible. 
Recent developments between Google and China serve as an 
illustration of how Chinese censorship may evolve. In December 2009, 
Google was the victim of a “hack attack” in which hackers gained access to 
the Google accounts of several Chinese human rights activists.174 The 
attacks were suspected (and later confirmed) to be linked to the Chinese 
government,175 and as a result, Google left China altogether on March 22, 
2010.176 In a bold move, Google removed its Chinese domain, rerouting 
visitors to its Hong Kong site, which does not filter its search results177—a 
move that angered Chinese officials.178 However, what happened next 
provides an interesting glimpse into the psyche of the Chinese government. 
Rather than immediately blocking Google, China waited. About a week 
later, China had neither permanently blocked Google nor revoked its 
license.179 And despite blocking Google China on March 30, 2010, China 
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restored access to Google the very next day.180 This cat and mouse game 
continued until June 2010, when China threatened to revoke Google’s 
license if it did not stop redirecting users.181 Google complied and China 
renewed Google’s license in early July 2010.182 While Google China is 
currently still operational, Google refuses to censor information and, 
therefore, only delivers results for limited searches such as on products and 
music.183  
China may threaten companies who do not comply with its strict 
censorship laws, but the fact is, China wants Google there184—it wants 
these ICPs operating within its markets. China’s hesitance to block Google 
completely is a sign that its fears the effects of doing so would have on the 
Chinese people. For a government that relies on its citizens for its 
legitimacy, China does not want to block Google actively. The most avid 
supporters of Google also happen to be highly educated and outspoken 
citizens.185 According to one Beijing consultant, “To block Google entirely 
is not necessarily a desirable outcome for the government . . . It’s going to 
boil down to whether authorities feel it is acceptable for users to be 
redirected to that site without having to figure it out themselves.”186 
Furthermore, the public’s response to Google’s announced departure was 
one of sadness. When Google initially announced its plans to leave China 
in January, young Chinese citizens left wreaths outside Google’s Beijing 
headquarters to express their dismay.187 Chinese citizens support these ICPs 
and they hope that companies like Google will remain active in their 
country. If its citizens want these companies to remain in the market, it 
behooves China to keep them there (in whatever capacity possible) because 
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it is within China’s best interests to keep its citizens happy. Blocking 
Google would be a very aggressive move for China—a move, it is clear, 
that it does not want to make.  
Ultimately, the fact that China is cognizant of the importance of 
having companies like Google in its markets and, furthermore, that these 
companies seem to be making an important impact making it that much 
more essential that they remain in China. But staying in China’s market 
prompts the serious question of how to deal with the violations that occur 
as a result of these corporations complying with Chinese laws. This 
question will continue to be difficult; however, even proposals like the 
Global Network Initiative and the Global Compact can play an important 
role in helping these companies tighten up their operations in order to avoid 
contributing to human rights violations. Google has kept (and will continue 
to keep) its servers outside of China,188sheltering it from legal requests for 
information on dissidents. Yahoo! appears to be following suit—when it 
launched its new portal in Vietnam, it did not establish its servers there.189  
Furthermore, the Great Firewall is far from impenetrable. VPNs 
(virtual private networks) and proxy servers are useful in allowing Chinese 
citizens to have access to information that is otherwise blocked.190 
Likewise, users are misspelling words as well as substituting words that 
sound similar to banned words as a means of getting around the filters.191 
This bottom-up approach used by citizens to usurp the system will only 
continue since the Chinese people are continuously looking for new ways 
to get around China’s firewall.192 Interestingly enough, a niche market has 
developed for software engineers who are constantly creating new 
technology that enables users to circumvent filtering systems in order to 
access information on the Internet.193 
Finally, the World Trade Organization (WTO) may become a viable 
forum for pressuring the Chinese government to stop heavily censoring its 
citizens. Since China’s censorship practices could be deemed 
anticompetitive and a restraint on trade, taking up grievances with the 
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WTO may be an effective deterrent to continued Chinese censorship.194 
Although some serious doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of 
using the WTO,195 the Obama Administration is showing signs that it is 
willing to use the WTO to influence China’s economic decision making.196 
Ultimately, however, it remains to be seen whether the WTO will be an 
effective venue for challenging China’s firewall. 
In the end, while it is important to ensure that these ICPs are not 
adding to the problem, what we really need to be concerned with is 
achieving change in the long term. It is unclear whether China will 
liberalize its policies on Internet speech, but the likelihood of such an 
evolution is much greater with American ICPs in China than if they were 
mandated to cease their Chinese operations. Though American complicity 
in Chinese censorship is an unsavory thought, domestic and international 
law should focus on long-term advancement instead of short-run flaws.   
V. CONCLUSION 
You are talking about [Internet] technology that everyone 
acknowledges is critical for liberalization and democratization . . . In 
our world, taking the position that if it’s not 100 percent, you shouldn’t 
go in is just not sensible if what you want at the end of the day is more 
human rights and [I]nternet freedom.197 
What Google has done in China is somewhat provocative. An 
American ICP has taken a stand against a major world power, and its 
actions potentially have created a path toward change. China’s reaction is 
noteworthy, and Google’s actions have unearthed a glimmer of hope that 
China is willing to alter its ways. It will just take time.  
At first glance, it seems per se objectionable, even repulsive, to argue 
that American ICPs should remain in China’s market, complicit in its 
censorship operations and potentially contributing to further human rights 
abuses. But it is important to step back and understand that China’s notions 
of rights and freedoms are still at the infant stage, but budding signs of 
progress exist that foreshadow future progress. We cannot expect every 
country to be the United States.198 Therefore, we must not view “success” 
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in China in terms of American standards. We must rejoice in small 
victories and encourage the Chinese government to increase openness 
while encouraging American content providers to sustain and grow their 
presence in the Chinese market. China’s response to Google’s latest actions 
shows promise for the future and objective evidence that a watered-down 
Google is better than no Google at all. 
Recent news developments further justify exercising patience with the 
Chinese government. On October 16, 2010, Li Qiming, the son of a senior 
police chief, hit two female students while driving under the influence, 
killing one of them.199 Initially, Li was remorseless and drove off, believing 
that he would remain insulated from reprimand because his father served as 
a local chief of police.200 In the past, Li may very well have escaped any 
punishment;201 however, news of the hit-and-run ignited a public outrage 
on the Internet, prompting Li to issue a tearful apology on national 
television.202 Then, in January of 2011, Li was sentenced to six years in 
prison and ordered to pay nearly $70,000 in compensation to his victims.203  
Similarly, a Chinese web site called 703804.com recently has been 
coined by some Chinese citizens as the new Chinese WikiLeaks.204 The 
web site hosts various discussion forums for music, chat, and social 
networking, but its most important function is that it facilitates core public 
speech by providing a forum for local citizens to voice their concerns about 
local problems, including government corruption.205 While the Chinese 
government has taken the site down numerous times, it decided to approach 
the site’s creator, Ye Zhe, a few years ago to negotiate.206 In exchange for 
Zhe’s promise to temper political discussions on his forum, the government 
agreed to allow the site to remain in operation.207 While some argue that 
703804.com is a very limited victory for the Chinese people (as the forum 
is strictly limited to discussions regarding local government corruption), 
many others argue that the government’s tolerance of the site is a far cry 
                                                                                                                 
acceptable speech, yet they are still considered advanced, rather than backward, countries.  
 199. Father and Son Apology for Hit-and-Run Seen as ‘Show,’ GLOBAL TIMES, 
http://www.lifeofguangzhou.com/node_10/node_37/node_82/2010/10/25/128797556981269
.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2010). 
 200. See China Hit-and-Run Driver Sentenced to Six Years in Jail, BBC.CO.UK (Jan. 30, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12317756. 
 201. See Rob Gifford, Internet Helps to Hold Chinese Accountable, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133233065/Internet-Helps-To-Hold-
Chinese-Accountable (click on “Listen to the Story”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. China Hit-and-Run Driver Sentenced to Six Years in Jail, supra note 200. 
 204. Gifford, supra note 201. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
732 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
from even a decade ago and is a “huge step forward in [attaining 
government] accountability.”208 
Ultimately, it is already apparent that conditions in China are ripe for 
change. But in the mean time, there are no quick or easy answers to this 
predicament. What is certain, though, is that leaving the market entirely 
would be counter-productive to the ultimate goal of bringing more freedom 
to China. If the United States truly wishes to see more Western influence 
on speech-related issues, it only makes sense that Western corporations 
should be allowed to continue operating in the Chinese market rather than 
pulling out and leaving it to operate in isolation. American ICPs are in a 
perfect position to take advantage of opportunities to increase the flow of 
information into China. Their presence, therefore, is not only a short-term 
boon to our tech sector but will continue to present very real opportunities 
for growth. While it is certainly necessary to avoid further contributions to 
human rights violations, big changes will not happen overnight. To “fix” 
China, we must first embrace small victories and understand that a 
satisfactory long-term solution is possible but that, for now, maintaining an 
open dialogue can only work to accelerate the ultimate goal of bringing 
Internet freedom to the Chinese people. 
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